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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the food price surge of 2005 to 2008 in order to better understand the factors 
causing higher and more volatile food prices during this period, to ascertain the relative importance and 
possible persistence of the different factors,  and to suggest possible implications for future market 
behavior and policy reactions. Given the highly uncertain outlook for petroleum price and its increasing 
impact on agricultural and food prices, the near-term outlook for major grains and oilseeds is generated 
from the latest USDA crop estimates and the FAPRI stochastic analysis of early 2008. Price projections 
to 2010/11 crop year are generated for major grains and oilseeds, given petroleum prices that average 
$48, $67, and $95 per barrel. 
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Introduction 
Since 2005, the rising level and increased volatility of commodity prices, especially food prices, 
have captured headlines and stimulated a wide range of analytical activity and policy discourse. It has 
caused hardship in many developing countries, led to social unrest in scores of these countries and, 
according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN), added 75 
million people to the number of undernourished and reversed progress toward the UN Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) hunger target. Although monthly prices of grains and oilseeds have declined 
substantially since mid-2008, they are still 50-100 percent higher than in 2005 with no guarantee that 
this price surge will not be repeated in the future. Therefore, it is important to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the factors leading to the food price surge in order to better analyze the market and 
policy implications for the near and long-term. 
Agricultural markets are traditionally very volatile due to weather variation and inelastic (short 
run) supply and demand. Also, rapid technological change since the end of World War II has combined 
with inelastic demand for food to generate declining real agricultural prices. Consumers have been the 
ultimate beneficiaries of agricultural technology while farmers have had to continually grow in size, as 
well as improve technological and financial practices, to offset price declines. Governments in high 
income countries adopted various support and protective trade policies to safeguard their farmers from 
these price declines, which often contributed further to low prices. This long-term decline in real prices 
has periodically been interrupted by price spikes that were mostly caused by yield declines due to poor 
weather.  
The largest and most prolonged price surge since the end of WWII (figure 1) was largely driven 
by macroeconomic shocks, including the first and second oil price shock in the 1970s, high inflation, 
dollar depreciation and the collapse of the Bretton Woods currency system, which regulated 
international monetary relations. In real terms, the price surge in the early 1970s was more severe than 
the recent one and was more persistent than the weather induced price shocks that came in subsequent 
years. One important question now being widely discussed is whether the current price surge will 
ultimately lead back to the long run declining real price path or will it leave real prices on a higher long-
term path? 
Part of understanding the recent price surge is to recognize that while having some common 
roots, the price developments have also differed from commodity to commodity in terms of the scale, 
timing and duration of the price surge (figures 2, 3 and 4). The rise of crude oil prices (West Texas 
Intermediate monthly average), which reached and stayed above $40/barrel beginning in July 2004 and 
continued to increase, started earlier, lasted longer and rose much higher than most of the food 
commodity price surges. Most of the food price surges became noticeable in 2006, although rice prices 
were rather calm until late 2007 and had a far more rapid and severe price rise and fall than other grains 
and oilseeds. These patterns suggest some common themes but also some distinct factors for different 
commodities. 
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Figure 1. Declining real prices of grains and soybeans, 2000 US$ 
 
Source: USDA prices deflated by gross domestic product deflator. 
 
 
Figure 2. Real food and crude oil price developments, Jan. 2003-Aug. 2008, 2005=100 
 
Source: UN/DESA (DPAD), based on IMF databases. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
20
03
M
1
20
03
M
7
20
04
M
1
20
04
M
7
20
05
M
1
20
05
M
7
20
06
M
1
20
06
M
7
20
07
M
1
20
07
M
7
20
08
M
1
20
08
M
7
Food real Crude oil  (real)
 4 
 
Figure 3. Nominal Rice and Palm Oil prices, June 2005 to Aug 2008 
 
Source: IMF commodity price database. 
 
Figure 4. Nominal Grain and Soybean Prices, June 2005 to Aug 2008 
 
Source: IMF commodity price database. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
20
05
M
6
20
05
M
12
20
06
M
6
20
06
M
12
20
07
M
6
20
07
M
12
20
08
M
6
do
lla
rs
 p
er
 m
et
ri
c 
to
n
Rice Palm Oil
 5 
First the setting for the price surge is analyzed, then a series of numerous supply, demand and 
macroeconomic factors that interacted in various ways and contributed in some degree to the price surge 
are evaluated. The increasing interdependence of food and energy markets is explored in more depth in 
terms of its long-term influence on commodity market behavior as the role of biofuels and energy prices 
continue to be an important and growing factor in food markets. The next section explores these factors 
further in the context of possible future developments and assesses whether each factor is expected to be 
a persistent influence on markets and prices, a temporary or a very uncertain one. The results of this 
analysis have implications for future challenges and opportunities that are discussed in the next section. 
Finally, the near-term outlook prospects are discussed using the most recent USDA, FAO and FAPRI 
analyses for 2008/9–2010/11. 
 
Preamble to the price surge 
In the years leading up to the price surge, consumption of the five major grains exceeded 
production and by large amounts in three of those years (figure 5). As a consequence, ending stocks of 
grain were drawn down to 40 percent of 1998/99 levels. The stock-to-use ratio reached record low levels 
(figure 6) for total grains, coarse grains and wheat. It was also the lowest since the 1972 price surge for 
maize (Schnepf, 2008). Likewise, the vegetable oil stock-to-use ratio reached the lowest level since 
1972, though for oilseeds in general the stocks situation was not as dire. 
 
Figure 5. World production and consumption of maize, wheat, rice, sorghum and barley 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
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Figure 6. Grain ending stocks and stocks-to-use ratio 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
 
A longer run contributor to the tightening conditions in the early part of this decade was the 
slowing rates of grain production growth. The international research investments of the 1960s were 
deliberate policy actions to enhance agricultural productivity in developing countries and resulted in the 
high yielding Green Revolution wheat and rice varieties that spurred yield growth and enhanced 
multiple cropping opportunities with shorter growing seasons. Along with continuing public and private 
agricultural research and development (R&D) in industrial countries, these improved technologies 
supported grain yield growth of 2.4 percent and production growth of 3.1 percent annually from 1960-
1980. Yield growth in the 1980s remained relatively high, but grain area declined. From 1990 until 2007 
world grain production only grew an average of one percent annually and yields a mere 1.3 percent per 
annum (table 1).   
 
Table 1. Exponential growth rates in area, yield and production of grains and oilseeds 
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-07 
Grains     
  Yield 2.8 1.9 2.4 1.3 
  Area 0.5 0.9 -0.5 -0.2 
  Production 3.3 2.8 1.6 1.0 
  Consumption 3.3 2.6 1.7 1.2 
Grains and Oilseeds     
  Area 1.6 1.3 -0.03 0.2 
  Production 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.4 
  Consumption 4.1 2.9 2.0 1.5 
 
Source: Calculated from PSD database, USDA. 
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Grain area peaked in 1981 and some of that land moved into oilseeds, but total land in grains and 
oilseeds grew by less than 0.2 percent per annum from 1981-2007. So, at least since 1990, yield and 
production growth have been slowing for both grains and oilseeds. For both grains and the total of grains 
and oilseeds, consumption growth rates also declined over time. Declining growth in population has 
been dominating the effect of income growth on consumption (Alexandratos). Nevertheless, 
consumption growth rates still exceeded production growth rates from 1990 onward, and for grains this 
was also true for the 1980-90 decade.   
Several factors contributed to the relatively slow production growth and stocks decline in the last 
two decades. The key market factor was declining real prices for an extended period that reduced market 
incentives to invest and produce. It was interrupted only by short-lived price surges in short crop years 
in 1988/89 and 1995/96. So, grain area declined (figure 7) while yield growth was also slowing. The 
most dramatic recent example was China, where grain area was reduced by 14 million hectares or nearly 
16 percent of grain cropland between 1999 and 2003 (figure 8), and production dropped well below 
consumption levels (figure 9). A little more than half of this land came back into grain production by 
2006/07 in response to government support policies, but several years of shortfall caused the 
government to reduce stocks by 66 percent from their 1999 levels in order to avoid higher imports 
(figure 10). This decline in China’s grain stocks accounted for 87 percent of the global grain stocks 
decline during the same period. 
 
Figure 7. World grain area relative to nominal price of wheat 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
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Figure 8. Grain harvested area, ROW on right axis 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
 
Figure 9. China’s total grains production and consumption 
 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
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Figure 10. World grain ending stocks 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
 
On the policy side, production support and trade barriers in some developed countries insulated 
these producers from world price fluctuations and stimulated more production than market signals 
would justify. For example, domestic price supports in the European Union (EU) resulted in export 
subsidies for grains that further depressed world market prices. The United States (US) also had wheat 
export subsidies that were discontinued in the 1980s. These support levels (especially support tied to 
production) as measured by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 
producer support estimate (PSE) have been gradually declining (figure 11) during negotiations for the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and since its adoption in 1994.  
Furthermore, national stocks policies and price support stocks also were reduced or disbanded in 
the pre and post-URAA era. The large decline in US grain stocks after 1986/87 was primarily due to 
elimination of the Farmer-Owned Reserve Program and other policy changes that essentially eliminated 
government owned stocks as well (figure 10). One may conclude that even if agricultural and food trade 
liberalization was progressing slowly after the URAA, many countries have seen less need for price 
support or buffer stocks or to build national food security reserves, as trade was expected to offer an 
improved alternative for offsetting domestic shortfalls. 
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Figure 11. Producer Support Estimate and Nominal protection coefficient, average of OECD members 
 
Source: OECD Statistics. 
 
An important policy factor in slowing yield growth rates, especially for rice and wheat (figure 
12), is that national and international public investment support for agricultural R&D has slowed in 
developing countries and even in developed economies since the 1990s (Van Braun et al., 2008). It has 
been well established in numerous documents of the World Bank, FAO and IFPRI that investment in 
agriculture has been lagging in developing countries especially. The World Bank Development Report 
2008 states that the developing countries have “suffered from neglect and underinvestment over the past 
20 years. While 75 percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas, a mere four percent of official 
development assistance goes to agriculture in developing countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a region 
heavily reliant on agriculture for overall growth, public spending for farming is also only four percent of 
total government spending”.  
Pardey et al. found that growth in public agricultural R&D spending, which was critical to the 
Green Revolution, declined by more than 50 percent in most developing countries from 1980 onward 
and even turned negative in high-income countries from 1991 onward. There were important exceptions 
in China and India (World Bank, 2007), but national governments and international organizations 
mainly have neglected these investments, despite the high rates of return that have been demonstrated in 
past R&D projects. 
Finally, it is part of the normal behavior of commodity markets that a shortfall in production 
results in a drawdown of stocks and more volatile price behavior. In this regard, the relatively modest 
price increases and stock declines of 2002/3-2003/4 are similar to those of 1988/89-1989/90 and 
1995/96 (figure 13); but unlike the two previous periods, production in subsequent years was not 
sufficient to meet growing consumption and also rebuild stocks. So when the next shortfall occurred in 
2006/7, stocks were not adequate to buffer it. As already noted, the demand for agricultural commodities 
is very price inelastic, so even in the face of rising prices, consumption growth remained strong. 
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Figure 12. Exponential growth rates for yields the previous 10 years 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
 
Figure 13. World grain stocks to use ratio and real wheat and maize prices 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
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The Perfect Storm 
Given the tight market situation in the middle of this decade as represented by low stock levels, 
there was no possibility for the market to absorb, without substantial price increases, a series of 
developments that all worked to increase demand or limit supply. This combination of events is 
illustrated in the conceptual model of figure 14, where there were several factors that shifted demand to  
 
Figure 14.  Illustration of all factors moving together to raise prices
 
 
the right, while supply shifts to the left were caused by bad weather in some countries and rising 
petroleum prices that were increasing production and transport costs. By itself, these supply and demand  
shocks would increase  price from P0 to P1, but then the shift in biofuel demand (Db1 to Db2) added 
another shift in demand raising price from P1 to P2
• Depreciation of the US dollar (figure 15) increased purchasing power of many importing 
countries and drove up the US$ price of commodities.  
. These shifts are enumerated below: 
• Rising petroleum prices (figure 15) not only increased production costs and transport 
costs for commodities; but combined with policies in a number of countries to stimulate 
increased biofuels production related to environmental and farm support objectives, they 
increased profitability of investments in biofuel capacity and stimulated the increased use 
of existing capacity resulting in more grains and oilseeds being used as feedstock for 
biofuel production.  
• Grain production shortfalls occurred in Australia and the EU two years in a row and to a 
lesser extent in Ukraine and Canada, while India produced more but exported less (figure 
16). Normally, these would not be such big market shakers, especially since world 
production actually increased slightly more than consumption. But in the face of record 
low stocks and continuing strong demand (figure 5), the price response in grains was 
dramatic (figures 17 and 18).  
P P
QQ
Diagram of a perfect storm
rest of grain demand grain for ethanol market
S S - D1
D1 Db1
Db2
P2
P1
P0
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Figure 15. Pattern of Crude oil and US$ moving in similar pattern since 2000 
 
Source: IMF commodity price database; Euro from Global Insight, Inc.  
 
Figure 16. Changes in grain production and net exports for 05/06 to 07/08 crop years 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
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Figure 17. US maize price and world stocks-to-use ratio 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA.   
 
Figure 18. Thai rice price and world stocks-to-use ratio 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
 
• There was not a similar shortfall in oilseeds markets, but shifting of cropland from 
oilseeds to grains, especially in the US, quickly brought the price boom to oilseeds 
(figure 19).  
• In reaction to the rising international prices and in order to safeguard domestic 
consumers, numerous exporting countries banned, taxed or otherwise limited exports of 
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grains and oilseeds and numerous importing countries reduced import tariffs, subsidized 
consumers or increased imports as precautionary measures (Trostle, FAO). These policy 
interventions, of course, increased the pressures on world market prices, and even some 
emergency food aid purchases by the World Food Program were delayed by these 
measures.  
• During this time period there was increased activity in futures markets by financial 
investors (non-commercial traders), who may have been diversifying their portfolios or 
expecting greater returns than in alternative investments. It may well be the case that 
noncommercial trading (e.g. institutional investors or index funds) drove futures contract 
prices higher than they would otherwise have been and later contributed to their rapid 
decline, but there is no clear evidence that these investors had or will have any net impact 
on season average price levels (CFTC, Irwin et al., Good et al.). These investors are 
buying and selling contracts but never take ownership of the product, so the argument is 
that they may increase short term volatility but there is still no evidence that they have 
influenced season average price by moving supply or demand.   
• Long-term demand growth driven by population and income growth is also important in 
this story, especially in cases where demand is growing faster than supply (table 1). 
However, demand is seldom a factor that is a market shock, because it develops in a more 
predictable manner. A fast emerging new demand component, such as biofuels, could be 
an exception. But even in this case, plant construction takes time and is well known by 
market agents, so it was no surprise to the market.  
 
Figure 19. US soybean price and world stocks-to-use ratio 
 
Source: PSD database, USDA. 
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As already noted above, there are differences and similarities in how the price surges played out for 
different commodities, which are compared in figure 20. In particular, a starting point in January 2003 is 
used to indicate when a monthly price increased by more than a certain percentage of the January 2003 
level. Crude oil first hit the 50 percent increase level in late 2004 while rice reached that level of 
increase six months later, then remained stable for nearly three years (table 2). Maize reached the 50 
percent increase level in late 2006 but did not have another major increase until early 2008. Oilseeds, 
palm oil and wheat prices started the surge a bit later in mid 2007 and continued to increase to their 
peaks in early to mid 2008. Barley price also began to rise in mid 2007 but did not go as high nor 
increase as quickly as others. Maize and soybeans were last in getting to more than 150 percent above 
January 2003 levels and barley never got that high. The maximum increase in the monthly average of 
crude oil price (306 percent in July 2008) was much higher than for most agricultural commodities, 
though rice had an even higher and slightly earlier (408 percent in April 2008) peak. 
 
Figure 20.  Differing patterns of monthly price developments among commodities 
 
Source: Calculated from IMF commodity price database.  
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Table 2. Differences in speed and level of monthly price increases from January 2003 
Price greater than 
X percent over 
January 2003 
Crude 
oil 
Rice Maize Barley Palm 
Oil 
Soybeans Wheat 
Greater than 50% 10/04 04/05 11/06 06/07 04/07 07/07 07/07 
Greater than 
100% 
04/06 02/08 02/08 03/08 11/07 12/07 09/07 
Greater than 
150% 
10/07 03/08 06/08 None 02/08 06/08 02/08 
Greater than 
200% 
03/08 03/08 None None None None None 
Maximum % over 
January 2003 
306% 408% 171% 118% 166% 166% 194% 
Month of 
maximum 
07/08 04/08 04/08 07/08 03/08 07/08 03/08 
Source: Calculated from IMF commodity price database.  
 
Looking at this main period of the price surge from crop year 2005/06 to 2007/08, we can make 
a few conclusions on some of these differences in price developments and factors behind them. All these 
price surges occurred after the crude oil price increases and US$ depreciation were already well 
underway, and we know from the impacts they have on demand and supply that both of these factors 
contributed to the price surges of all these products. At least these two factors are common to all cases, 
though the impacts would certainly have different magnitudes. The US$ depreciation is quickly 
translated into increased purchasing power in all currencies that appreciated relative to the US$ and into 
higher US$ prices of traded commodities; but petroleum price has more impact on maize and vegetable 
oil prices, since higher petroleum prices stimulate greater biofuel investment and production. As demand 
for maize and vegetable oils increase, it raises the prices of maize and oilseeds, induces shifts in 
cropland from other crops to these as well as substitution on the demand side for feed and food and 
thereby increases prices of other crops. Petroleum price increases also raise production costs of all crops; 
and increased crop prices raise production cost for livestock and dairy, so over the period of two years or 
more these impacts permeate throughout the agricultural industry. Likewise, the higher petroleum prices 
increase processing and transport costs (figure 21), and over time this raises the farm to retail margins 
and the cost of food. 
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Figure 21. Rising levels of transport costs reflected in farm to FOB and Gulf to Rotterdam margins 
 
Source: FAPRI, 2008a. 
 
The trade restrictions also had differential impacts. The main export policy reactions were those 
listed below (FAO, July 2008):  
• Argentina increased export taxes on soybeans (27.5-35 percent), maize (20-25 percent), wheat 
(20-28 percent) and vegetable oils (8-10 percent). 
• Russia introduced a 10 and 30 percent tax, respectively, on wheat and barley exports. 
• Ukraine established quantitative restrictions on wheat exports and banned exports for a short 
time. 
• China introduced a 20 percent export tax on wheat, barley and oats and a 5 percent tax on maize, 
sorghum and rice and eliminated rebates on value-added taxes on grain exports. 
• Kazakhstan banned wheat and vegetable oil exports. 
• Indonesia raised the palm oil export tax from 10 to 20 percent. 
• Egypt, Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia, and India (except basmati) banned rice exports. 
 
A quantitative assessment of the market impacts of these interventions was done by Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada with the OECD-FAO model1
                                                 
1 The OECD/COSIMO model is a multi-market, partial equilibrium model. 
 and indicates that the impacts on season average 
prices were relatively small except for the case of rice (figure 22), though all of them likely had a greater 
impact on daily and monthly prices than on the season average price that is normally used in commodity 
models. Considering that it was an annual price analysis, Ukraine was not included in the analysis, since 
the export restrictions were removed after only a few months. However, it reduced Ukraine’s exports 
substantially in 2007/08, occurred during a critical time of the season and left the market with only the 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08
D
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 m
et
ri
c 
to
n
Maize FOB-Farm Maize Rotterdam-Gulf  Wheat FOB-Farm
 19 
US and the drought impacted EU as alternative sources for wheat. It means this analysis likely 
underestimated the wheat and maize trade and price impacts. IFPRI used the MIRAGE model2
 
Source: Study conducted by Pierre Charlebois from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada using the 
OECD/FAO AGLINK/COSIMO model. 
 
 to 
analyze impacts of a stylized set of export restrictions, and estimated higher grain price impacts of up to 
30 percent (von Braun, 2008). This is a very difficult question to analyze, which may explain rather 
large differences in the results from different models. However, the cumulative price impacts of these 
policy reactions are likely to be significant both in terms of real effects and the expectation effects that 
increase short run volatility. 
Rice prices got a bump in early 2005, as consumption was exceeding production and stocks were 
declining for four years in a row (figure 18). But they remained rather steady until early 2008 when rice 
price surged rapidly for two months before starting to retreat. Since world rice production exceeded 
consumption in 2007/08 as well as in the previous year, there were no apparent market fundamentals 
that would generate such price behavior. Therefore, it seems more likely that the rice price surge was 
primarily due to the generally tight market/low stock conditions for grains in general and the rice export 
restrictions imposed by several countries (Abbott et al 2008). Rice trade is very thin, being between 6 
and 7.5 percent of consumption during the last ten years, so such trade restrictions can have very large 
price impacts.  The rapid price escalation also generated a kind of market panic that probably added 
public and private hoarding to the contributing factors. 
 
Figure 22. Estimated impact of export restriction policies on world prices 
Maize price started moving upward late in 2006, as production lagged consumption and stocks 
fell even lower (figure 17). Some analysts point to rapid income growth and dietary transition towards 
meats, especially in Asia, as a reason for rapid growth in maize demand. However, we have seen in table 
                                                 
2 MIRAGE is a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model.  
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1 that grain consumption growth is slowing despite these dietary changes. Evidence over the last ten 
years indicates continued growth but not an acceleration of growth in feed use or of food, seed and 
industrial use excluding maize for ethanol, but does show that the annual increases in maize used for 
ethanol production in the US have been accelerating (figure 23). In the period 2005/06 to 2007/08, US 
use of maize for ethanol production accounted for 31 percent of total grain consumption growth3
 
Source: Calculated from PSD database, USDA. 
* 30 percent of the maize for ethanol volume is the byproduct distiller’s dried grains (DDGs), which is 
used for feed. We count 70 percent of the volume as used for ethanol (industrial use of maize) and 30 
percent for feed. 
 
  
, while 
increased grain consumption in China and India together account for 33 percent (figure 24). So these are 
contributing nearly equally to the growth in grain use in this period, though use of maize as a biofuel 
feedstock is a relatively new component in this market and therefore is often viewed differently from 
normal growth in food and feed demand. As already noted, China’s grain production declines in the first 
few years of this decade had a major impact on global grain stocks (figures 9 and 10), which was 
probably a more important contributor to tight market conditions than was their consumption growth.  
 
Figure 23. Percent change in total world grain use by category* 
                                                 
3 When maize is used for ethanol production, 30 percent of the volume is the by-product distiller’s dried grains (DDGs), 
which is used for feed. Thus in order to correctly reflect feed and other uses, we count 70 percent of the volume as used for 
ethanol (industrial use of maize) and 30 percent for feed. 
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Figure 24. Shares in growth of grain consumption, 2005/06-2007/08 
 
Source: Calculated from PSD database, USDA. 
 
Palm oil, soybean, wheat and barley prices began rising in the middle of 2007. For soybeans, 
there was a clear impact from the shift of 5.5 million hectares from soybean to maize production in the 
US as a reaction to the rise in maize prices in 2006/07. This shift reduced US oilseed production by 16.6 
million tons, while world oilseed production declined only 14.6 million tons. This acreage shift could be 
considered a kind of “shock”, since its magnitude was unprecedented in the United States. Oilseed 
stocks/use had not declined until then, and most of the decline came in the United States. Meanwhile, 
world oilseed consumption growth was still strong, and China was a significant factor. In terms of 
oilseeds use, it is by far the fastest growing region (figure 25). India’s use, by contrast was down for 
several years before increasing the last five years. Vegetable oil consumption grew by more than 9 
percent but so did production.  
While food use grew by 7 percent, industrial use grew by 23 percent, though from a much 
smaller base (annex table 6). All growth in the EU and most in the US is for industrial use, most of 
which would be associated with biodiesel production. Use of vegetable oil for biodiesel production is 
much larger in the EU than in the US, but both are growing in response to higher petroleum prices and 
government support measures. Together these accounted for 21 percent of the growth in vegetable oil 
consumption, while China accounted for 19 percent (figure 26). Export taxes on palm oil introduced by 
Malaysia and Indonesia, export taxes by Argentina on soybeans and products, and export bans by 
Kazakhstan on export of oilseeds and vegetable oils were other contributing factors, though the 
Canadian analysis found its impact to be rather small (figure 22). 
 
  
 22 
Figure 25. Percent change in total total oilseed use by region 
 
Source: Calculated from PSD database, USDA. 
 
Figure 26.  Shares in growth of vegetable oil consumption, 2005/06-2007/08 
 
 
Source: Calculated from PSD database, USDA. 
 
Wheat was the hardest hit among the grains in terms of production shortfalls, and though the 
price surge started later than for maize, it increased faster and further and also peaked sooner. Two years 
of low production due to bad weather in Europe, Ukraine, Australia and Canada and declining stocks 
took its toll, and the market pressures were exacerbated with export restrictions by exporters and import 
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enhancing measures by importers starting in the fall of 2007 (Trostle). India reduced import tariffs on 
wheat flour and Indonesia, Serbia, and the EU reduced tariffs on imported wheat. Morocco and 
Venezuela introduced subsidies on imported foods. Such interventions are designed to limit domestic 
market disruptions but have the effect of increasing market disruptions in the world market, driving up 
prices further. Some of these interventions were rescinded later in 2008, starting with Ukraine’s export 
restrictions, while the high prices pulled in more wheat area, and the return of favorable weather 
increased yields for the 2008 crop.  
 While each of these commodities have their own stories, all of the grain and oilseed prices have 
been influenced by the common factors of rising petroleum prices and the depreciating US dollar. Their 
influence is a kind of “double whammy” in that they have been moving almost in lock step (figure 15). 
This is not to attribute causality of one price on the other, but is has been evident in this commodity 
cycle that they are at least driven by common factors. The most careful study of the exchange rate effect 
on the commodity price surge was conducted by Abbott et al. and they attribute more influence in this 
price surge to the weak dollar than to other market supply and demand fundamentals. Their method was 
to compare the recent price surge to the last one in the mid 1990s. They found that real foreign currency 
prices of grains moved in lock step with nominal dollar prices in the mid 1990s, suggesting that these 
price movements were mainly due to supply-utilization shocks, such as bad crop yields. By contrast, 
analysis of the recent price surge showed that US$ price increases for grains and soybeans were 
“typically more than three times equivalent changes in other, deflated currencies.” They concluded that 
exchange rates are far more important in the recent price surge, but did not attempt to quantify that. As 
they correctly concluded, the complex interactions of numerous factors make it impossible to ascribe 
shares of causality to different factors with any degree of confidence. We do, however, report some 
results on the price impacts of eliminating biofuel support measures in the United States, which are often 
mentioned as a significant factor in the grain price surge.  
Much attention has been given in various food price analyses to the role of biofuels policies, 
especially those in the US and the EU. In fact, the use of crops for biofuel and more generally bioenergy 
production has been on the rise in recent years in response to both increased energy prices and rising 
concern about green house gas emissions arising from fossil fuel consumption. Many countries have 
biofuel production activities, including Argentina, Canada, and China; but the US and Brazil are the 
largest producers of ethanol; and the EU is the largest producer of biodiesel, though still at a much 
smaller scale than the ethanol industry in the US and Brazil (Trostle). 
Since the US is the largest ethanol producer and has been the focus of most of these studies, we 
look primarily at the US maize ethanol industry. Maize ethanol is not a new product in the US market 
nor a new area of economic research, but until recently it was a very small and stable component of 
grain market demand. In this initial phase of development, maize based ethanol production had only a 
minor impact on commodity market behavior. However, the maize market has gone through a 
remarkable behavioral transformation in the past few years.  
The main growth in this market began in 2005/06, the “golden year” of maize biofuel profits, 
when the combination of a new biofuel use mandate, the continued ethanol blenders’ tax credit of $0.51 
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per gallon ($0.130/liter) and import tariff on ethanol of $0.54 per gallon ($0.138/liter), the rapid phase-
out of MTBE as a fuel oxygenate and rising petroleum prices guaranteed high profits and stimulated a 
rapid expansion of the industry. The next phase was inaugurated through the effects of the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA), which introduced a much higher maize biofuel mandate and will 
change the fundamental behavior of the market if and when the new mandate becomes a binding 
constraint. The mandate has not yet been binding, because oil prices have been high; but at lower oil 
prices it could be binding in the near future. 
 Ethanol production from maize boomed in response to increased incentives, guaranteed demand 
levels and increased profitability. Petroleum prices became a very important demand shift variable for 
maize because of its effect on ethanol prices. This introduced a new and significant source of price 
volatility into the maize market and any other crop and livestock markets that are closely linked to 
maize. The growth in the biofuel sector, which has drawn agriculture and energy markets more closely 
together, raised commodity prices, and injected energy market volatility into agriculture markets as seen 
in figure 27. An additional stochastic element is added through the larger role of maize used for ethanol 
and the impact of oil price on that demand. Over certain ranges, and in the long run, demand for 
feedstocks to produce biofuels may be highly elastic and stabilize maize prices with respect to shocks 
that originate in agricultural markets. But the price level at which the commodity is stabilized is 
dependent on the price of petroleum and therefore subject to its fluctuations. The net effect on 
commodity price volatility remains uncertain. This long run representation also fails to explain observed 
fluctuations in the relationship over a shorter time frame. Factors relating to supply and demand are 
more constrained in the short run, and thus the linkages of petroleum to commodity prices may be quite 
different. 
 
Figure 27. Increased market volatility due to biofuel/energy nexus 
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 EISA added a set of layered mandates to the existing tax credit given to biofuel blenders. The 
mandates extend out to 2022 for four classes of biofuels to be used in the motor fuel supply and are 
broken out primarily based on feedstock and green house gas reduction characteristics. At high enough 
oil prices or low enough feedstock prices, the mandates have little effect, as the market will clear at 
volumes above mandated levels. This has so far been the case, since mandates have not yet been 
binding. However, at lower oil prices or higher feedstock prices, the mandates may become binding. In 
these situations the blenders’ tax credit induces no additional production, and the mandate largely 
disconnects the link biofuels generate between commodity markets and energy price movements. 
Because feedstock demand for maize becomes invariant to ethanol and commodity prices when 
mandates are binding, the price effect of any significant supply shock also will be amplified.   
An examination of biofuels policies under alternative petroleum prices (figure 28), shows the 
possible effects on commodity price volatility (Thompson et al 2008). The blenders’ tax credit and tariff 
increase the size of the ethanol industry and raise commodity price levels at all petroleum prices but 
have greater impacts at higher prices. When the mandate provisions in the EISA are added, the partial 
unlinking of petroleum and ethanol prices occurs. At low petroleum prices, the mandates support ethanol 
production and therefore maize prices, when compared to other scenarios where mandates are absent. At 
high petroleum prices, the mandate is not binding and the maize price is nearly invariant with respect to 
existence of the mandates. The mandates then may be thought of as limiting the downside effects of 
petroleum price variation on commodity prices or a kind of buffer against low oil prices. This may be 
important in the near future, since declining oil prices may lead to binding mandates as early as 2009. 
 
Figure 28:  Maize price by oil price, 2015/16 crop year 
 
Source: Thompson, Meyer and Westhoff. 
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
Below $40 $40-$55 $55-$70 $70-$85 $85-$100 $100-$115 above $115
Dollars per barrel
D
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 m
et
ric
 to
n
EISA, tariffs and credits Tariffs and credits, no EISA No EISA, no tariffs and credits
 26 
 
Many analysts attempted to calculate the contribution of biofuel use of grains and/or oilseeds to 
the food price increases that have occurred. Since the growth of the biofuels industry is driven by the 
energy market as well as by policies, the most reliable approach is to ask what biofuel production and 
grain prices would be if there were no supporting measures. That is, what if the use of crops for biofuel 
production were driven only by energy prices in the market? FAPRI ran scenarios at different petroleum 
prices (FAPRI, 2008) to see the price impacts of removing the US support policies from a “full policy” 
base or adding them to a “no policy” base. What is clear from the results is that the blenders’ tax credit 
of $0.51 per gallon of ethanol and the $0.54 per gallon import tariff on ethanol have less impact than the 
mandate when oil prices are low, and a greater impact than the mandate when oil prices are high (table 
3). This is because at high oil prices, the mandate has little impact on the level of maize use for ethanol 
production.  
These results cannot be extended to all ranges of possible prices, because clearly the market 
behaviors are quite different depending on the starting point or context. However, it is clear that with 
low petroleum prices, supporting policies can increase or decrease maize prices by 5-15 percent by 
stimulating the level of maize use for ethanol. It impacts prices of other commodities by a lesser amount 
through supply and demand linkages such as competition for land and substitution in feed use. It is also 
clear that the impacts are different and generally smaller at higher levels of petroleum prices.  Finally, 
one can conclude from this analysis that simply eliminating these support policies would not eliminate 
biofuel production and would reduce maize or grain prices by 15 percent or less, which is significant, 
but does not represent a major part of the price surge.  Note that all model analyses are looking at the 
season average price, which in volatile years moves about half as much as the monthly prices (Annex 
Figure). 
 
Table 3. Impact on maize price of US policy change under different oil prices 
 percent change in maize price, average 2008-2017 
Petroleum price $67/bbl $107/bbl 
   
Start from current policy   
  Credit and tariff expire -3.6 -6.0 
  Mandate expires -6.2 -0.4 
  All policies expire -14.1 -9.4 
   
Start from no support   
  Add credit and tariff 9.2 9.9 
  Add mandate 12.2 3.8 
  Add all policies 16.4 10.4 
Source: FAPRI, June 2008. 
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Another analysis of removing subsidies and tariffs (but not mandates and targets) was conducted 
for ethanol and biodiesel in all producing countries (FAO, 2008h). These policies include ethanol import 
tariffs of the US ($0.138/liter) and of the EU (0.26 $/liter), and the blender’s tax credit in the US. Brazil 
has no subsidies, and other producers are quite small in comparison with these three. Removal of all 
these tariffs, subsidies and tax credits, leads to more than 13 billion liters reduction in ethanol production 
and consumption (10-15 percent) and 3.3 billion liters reduction in biodiesel production and 
consumption (15-20 percent) and a reduction of about 5 percent in maize and vegetable oil prices. These 
magnitudes of price impact, though they include biodiesel and other countries as well as the US, are 
similar to the results of FAPRI in removing the ethanol tax credit and tariff in the US only.      
An analysis by OECD (August 2008) approached this analysis differently by holding biofuel 
production in all countries constant from 2007 to 2017. Such an assumption does not reveal how that 
freeze would be achieved but resulted in maize and vegetable oil prices about 15 percent lower and 
wheat five percent lower than in the unconstrained projection. The other model-based analysis of this 
question was by IFPRI, which compared actual biofuel production from 2000-2007 to a scenario where 
biofuel production in all countries grew as slowly as it had up to 2000. This scenario resulted in cereal 
prices that were about 10 percent lower in real terms (Rosegrant, 2008). IFPRI also analyzed a freezing 
of biofuel production worldwide, similar to the OECD scenario, which reduced projected maize prices 
by six percent in 2010 and 14 percent by 2017. Its effect on wheat and vegetable oils was estimated to 
be less than half of these percentages.  
So the IFPRI, FAO, FAPRI and OECD model analyses suggest that the price impacts of biofuel 
production growth or of biofuel support policies could change maize prices 15 percent or less and other 
crops to a lesser extent, though IFPRI is the only one of the three studies that was conducted over the 
actual historical time period. FAPRI and FAO are the only analyses that focused on eliminating support 
policies, while the others postulated alternative biofuel production paths. These scenarios do not 
eliminate biofuel production completely, since biofuel production is also driven by rising petroleum 
prices. Also, if there had never been biofuel support policies, the impact likely would have been greater, 
since the policies surely encouraged investment in expansion of the industry in the first place. To assess 
the outer bound of biofuel impacts, IFPRI estimated the price impacts of eliminating biofuels production 
around the world and found a price reduction for maize of about 20 percent, and half that for wheat and 
sugar.4
                                                 
4 The highest reported estimate of biofuel impacts on commodity prices increases was 70-75 percent (Mitchell, 
2008), but this was not a model-based estimate and moreover was not only the impact of biofuels, but as the author states 
“was due to biofuels and the related consequences of low grain stocks, large land use shifts, speculative activity and exports 
bans”. All of these “consequences” cannot be attributed solely to biofuels or biofuel policies.  
 Finally, it should be noted that the significant declines in short run commodity prices since July 
2008 seem more related to movements of crude oil prices and exchange rates than to biofuel policies, 
which have not changed at all in this period. 
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Possible persistence of factors 
We now turn our attention to the task of looking ahead. If this was a perfect storm, it has passed, 
short run commodity prices have been declining; and the question is whether and how the future may be 
different or similar to this volatile period. By definition, a perfect storm is a rare event; and that also 
seems to be the case here. It does not mean such a price surge cannot happen again, but it is not the 
norm. Since early to mid 2008, monthly and daily petroleum and agricultural commodity prices have 
fallen from their peaks to levels that existed in mid 2007, so is it time to exhale or will the slightest 
weather event or market shock send them into orbit again? We address this by looking at each of the 
major factors and assessing whether it is likely to be persistent, temporary, or completely uncertain. 
Yield and production shortfalls–Poor weather and disease are generally considered to be 
temporary setbacks and have usually been a one year phenomenon and very seldom more than two. The 
natural disasters may be more frequent and extreme now and in the future due to climate change 
according to IPPC (IPPC 2007, page 299), but this factor is expected to be sporadic and short-lived even 
if the frequency of production setbacks were to be higher than in the past. In 2007/08 world grain 
production increased more than a five percent split almost evenly between area growth and yield growth. 
Projections for 2008/9 anticipate nearly a four percent grain supply increase (eight percent for wheat) 
and a very modest increase in stocks. However, this is not the type of increase in stocks that would be 
enough to calm markets or significantly moderate another demand or supply shock. High prices are 
already doing their work of inducing increased planting and higher yields, though they are being 
partially offset by production costs, such as fertilizer and fuel that rose with energy costs.  
Export restrictions and import barrier reductions–Most of the export restrictions have already 
been removed or reduced. It is anticipated that most of these export and import measures were seen as 
temporary safeguard measures and would not be maintained for a long time. China has kept export 
restriction measures mostly by eliminating the value added tax rebate, which has the effect of charging 
the same VAT on export and domestic sales. Argentina also maintains its export taxes, though further 
increases were successfully blocked by farmer protests. Most of the other export restrictions were 
temporary in nature and are now suspended. Argentina and other exporters who tax or restrict exports to 
dampen domestic grain prices have thereby also constrained the incentives for their producers to 
increase production. The same holds for importers who tried to dampen the transmission of rising 
internal prices to their domestic markets. In the past, WTO has focused mainly on measures which 
depress world prices, such as export subsidies and import tariffs or restrictions; and the disciplines 
regarding limiting exports or enhancing imports are weak or non-existent. There is weak language 
discouraging export restrictions in Article 12 on Disciplines on export prohibition and restrictions of the 
URAA, so it is not likely that any of the recent measures could be successfully challenged (Sharma and 
Konandreas 2008). Thus, in the event of another food price surge, there is little except diplomatic 
pressure to prevent similar disruptions from happening again.  
Dollar depreciation, petroleum price and the financial crisis–The dollar recently has been 
appreciating and oil prices are weakening substantially, continuing the parallel movement that we have 
seen during most of this decade (figure 15). As emphasized in the foregoing analysis, these are very 
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important factors in determination of commodity prices and in explaining the price surge. However, we 
put them in the “uncertain factor” category, because it would be difficult to predict which way they may 
move and when. The growing crisis in financial markets is just adding another level of risk and 
uncertainty to this highly volatile mixture and is adding trade financing to the list of market disruptions. 
The widespread slowdown in economic activity around the world certainly reduces the likelihood of 
higher oil prices; but in our price projections reported below, we show alternative commodity price 
developments under differing oil price scenarios. 
“Speculative” activity–The participation of noncommercial traders may be as erratic or uncertain 
as currency and petroleum prices, so it is likely that this aspect of market behavior will continue as in the 
recent past. Their participation has diminished recently as oil and commodity prices have declined, but it 
is equally likely that they could increase again in the future. 
Low stocks and stock/use ratios–The current outlook for the 2008/09 harvest of grains and 
oilseeds in the temperate countries shows good production increases, so we have already seen a 
softening of prices and expectations of a slightly larger stock carryover at the end of this year. However, 
even if this projection proves to be correct, it would take several good years like this one to make a 
significant increase in levels of carryover stocks. So this likely to be is a medium-term issue that may 
take years of average or better than average production or some as yet unexpected drop in consumption 
growth. 
Investment deficit in agriculture –As already mentioned, declining real prices may have 
contributed to the investment deficit even in developed countries. Though the market incentives are 
clearly better in the current situation, this investment deficit will be a long-term problem. It takes 
decades to see the returns to agricultural R&D, because part of the deficit is the lack of institutional 
capacity that takes time to build. Short-term response to higher prices will be limited, meanwhile, to 
increased land and input use and expanded exploitation of currently existing technologies. 
Long-term demand growth–Clearly a persistent factor, the rate of growth in demand for feed, 
food, seed and industry (excluding biofuels use) will depend upon population and income growth rates 
and is the most stable part of the market picture. The main uncertainty will be the possible downturn in 
economic performance due to the current financial market crisis, which would further reduce pressures 
on commodity prices.  
Biofuel production and support measures–The existence and growth of this industry is a 
persistent factor, since there is every expectation that it will continue to grow over time and its growth 
will be strongly linked to the price of petroleum as well as to various support measures. The only recent 
policy change in the US was to reduce the blenders’ tax credit from $0.51 to $0.45 per gallon. While the 
highly elastic demand for biofuel feedstocks might be thought of as a price stabilizer, the tighter 
linkages between highly volatile petroleum price and commodity prices as well as short run structural 
and policy constraints may add to commodity price volatility. Determining which factor is playing the 
primary role is highly dependent on the short run market context, such as the level of petroleum prices 
and whether or not the mandate is binding. While the effect on commodity price levels may be clearer, 
the net effect on price volatility remains uncertain. The EU also has not changed biofuel policies, but 
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they are under review and it is not yet clear yet how current targets would be achieved or how strictly 
they will be enforced.  
 
Implications for the future 
We have described a rather rapid transition from the decades-long period of falling real prices of 
grains and food more generally to a new market environment in which commodity and food prices are, 
higher, more volatile and more tightly linked to petroleum prices. Much of the market behavior seen 
during the past few years is linked to the growing interdependence of energy and agricultural markets.  
This market behavior and the conditions surrounding it are likely to continue, and the prospects of 
returning to the patterns of the previous decades are less likely.   
We have seen world markets turn around in recent months and many commodity prices have 
declined significantly from their peaks. However, this evidence of price retreat has yet to appear or is 
appearing more slowly in many developing countries, as seen in FAO’s regional food price update 
(FAO, Oct 2008). It means that markets that are insulated from or not well integrated with world 
markets may not in the near-term see the benefits of increased world production or reduced prices in the 
world market. Moreover, it is clear that rising commodity prices have more impact on food prices of 
consumers in low income countries than on those in high income countries. Aside from the higher share 
of income spent on food, the commodity price itself is a larger share of the household food cost in a low 
income country. An example in table 4 illustrates how a 50 percent increase in a commodity price would 
translate into an increase from 10-10.6 percent in the share of income spent on food in a high income 
country, while the same commodity price increase in a low income food deficit country (LIFDC) leads 
to an increase from 50-60.5 percent in the share of income spent on food in a low income country.  
Likewise, the food import bills have grown faster in developing countries (FAO 2008i). The food import 
bill of developing countries is estimated to increase by nearly 35 percent from 2007-2008 and 32 percent 
for LIFDCs. This is after another sharp rise the previous year. The scarcity of trade financing during the 
current financial crises only compounds this problem.   
The market conditions that have developed since 2005 and that seem likely to continue, even if 
food price increases have abated somewhat, raise challenges and offer opportunities. The challenge is 
how to provide safety nets for the most vulnerable populations that have been thrust into a much more 
desperate financial situation because of sharply higher food prices. The opportunity is that higher prices 
offer a chance to increase incomes from food production in many rural areas where agriculture is the 
main source of income and employment. To meet these challenges and exploit the opportunities, 
national and international policy actions are being recommended (FAO 2008a, World Bank 2008, von 
Braun et al 2008). 
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Table 4. Impact of Food Commodity Prices on Consumers’ Food Budgets 
 High-income 
countries 
Low-income food-
deficit countries 
I. Base Scenario   
   Income $40,000 $800 
  Food expenditure $4000 $400 
  Food costs as % of income 10% 50% 
 Disaggregate retail food spending 
(staples vs. non-staples) 
  
  Staples as % of total food spending 20% 70% 
  Expenditures on staples $800 $280 
  Expenditures on non-staples $3200 $120 
II. Scenario: 50% price increase in 
staples, partial pass through on staples 
  
  Assumed % pass through 60% 60% 
  Increase in cost of staples $240 $84 
  New cost of staples $1020 $364 
    New total food costs $4240 $484 
    Food costs as % of income 10.6% 60.5% 
Source: Trostle, 2008, page 25. 
Recommended short run measures include: 
• humanitarian assistance, and expansion of early warning and rapid response capacities 
• targeted food production programs with inputs, credit and extension education packages 
• international consultations on policy adjustments to relieve food price pressures, such as 
reduction or elimination of export restrictions  
• reconsider subsidies, tariff protection and mandates for biofuel production in view of food 
security effects   
Recommended long-term measures include: 
• undertake processes or adopt measures to calm markets and restore trust in the international 
trading system either through improved multilateral or plurilateral rules and agreements  
• complete the Doha Round of trade negotiations and improve disciplines on trade distortions 
created by export restrictions 
• improve existing or create new systems for emergency food-import financing 
• develop risk management systems that are accessible to farmers in developing countries 
• invest in social protection to protect vulnerable populations 
• improve local adaptation and dispersion of currently existing technology 
• mobilize investment in agriculture and agricultural R&D 
• improved market-oriented regulation of market institutions such as CFTC 
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It may well be that new international coordination or governance architecture needs to be 
developed based on knowledge gained during this food price crisis. It is clear that the trading system did 
not always function well during this crisis and that trust in the market was undermined by the behavior 
of many market participants. Lessons learned during this crisis can be used to improve institutions or 
mechanisms or to develop new ones. 
 
Near-term outlook 2008-09 to 2010-11 
The near-term outlook was conducted by FAPRI using the latest crop and crop supply, demand 
and price estimates for the 2008/09 crop year from USDA (USDA 2008) and for the next two years a 
distribution of FAPRI outlook results around the January 08 oil price forecast of Global Insight, Inc. The 
USDA supply and demand estimates are issued each month for the current marketing year, and are now 
showing a significant increase in wheat supply (8.2 percent) and lower but still positive growth in the 1-
5 percent range for other grains and oilseeds (table 5). FAO also issued a similar outlook in November, 
which is slightly more optimistic for rice and coarse grains and less optimistic for soybeans, but has a 
similar overall picture. These supply increases allow ending stocks to grow only slightly, so there would 
only be a small improvement in the tenuous market conditions.    
The FAPRI model used in the analysis of the next two years is a global, non-spatial, multi-
market model covering crops and livestock and the analytical processes have a 25 yearlong history of 
analysis of agricultural markets and policy. The model is non-spatial in that it does not differentiate 
products by their origin and is multi-market in its broad coverage of crop and livestock markets as well 
as biofuel markets and policy coverage. The crops sector is modeled through behavioral equations 
representing crop acreage, domestic feed, food industrial and biofuel feedstock uses as well as stock 
holding and trade. Similarly, the livestock sector is modeled through behavioral equations determined by 
animal numbers, production of meat and dairy products, consumption, stock holding and trade.  
Equations in the biofuels sector tie into feedstock demands for grains and oilseeds, and 
behavioral equations determining ethanol and biodiesel production, consumption and trade (FAPRI, 
2008). The model solves for the set of prices that brings annual supply and demand into balance in all 
markets and across all countries. Because the biofuels industry is rapidly growing and very little data is 
available for the period of rapid expansion, many of these equations are synthetically derived by using 
knowledge of the technical relationships in the industry, making elasticity assumptions and calibrating to 
recent history. To be able to analyze alternative proposals, the FAPRI baseline assumes a continuation 
of current policies and then modifies those assumptions for scenario analysis. 
Given the highly uncertain outlook on petroleum prices in the outlook and the important linkages 
between oil and commodity prices, these commodity price projections are provided from the stochastic 
model so that alternative price paths could be provided for three different petroleum price scenarios. The 
stochastic model is a simplification of the larger FAPRI deterministic model and adds ‘uncertainty’ to 
the model by drawing on the historical ‘misses’ of the behavioral or yield equations. In this way there is 
a selective distribution of possible outcomes under different settings, be they yields, energy prices, or 
other factors. This uncertainty is important in understanding many agricultural policies and market 
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Table 5. USDA estimates for world supply and use changes 07/08 to 08/095
 
 
 Million units 07/08 to 08/09 FAO 
Wheat 2007/08 P 2008/09 F change % change % change 
  Area (hectares) 217.5 223.7 6.2 2.9%  
  Beginning stocks (metric tons) 3 127.0 119.4 -7.6 -6.0% -3.0% 
  Production (metric tons) 610.6 682.4 71.8 11.8% 10.9% 
   Supply (metric tons) 737.6 801.8 64.2 8.7% 8.0% 
  Exports (metric tons) 1 115.4 124.0 8.6 7.5% 7.0% 
  Consumption (metric tons) 2 618.2 656.5 38.3 6.2% 4.5% 
  Ending stocks (metric tons) 3 119.4 145.3 25.9 21.7% 20.3% 
   stocks to use ratio 0.19 0.22    
Coarse grains      
  Area (hectares) 316.9 312.8 -4.1 -1.3%  
  Beginning stocks (metric tons) 3 138.6 154.1 15.5 11.2% 4.3% 
  Production (metric tons) 1077.9 1091.7 13.8 1.3% 3.3% 
   Supply (metric tons) 1216.5 1245.9 29.3 2.4% 3.5% 
  Exports (metric tons) 1 123.6 110.5 -13.2 -10.7% -11.9% 
  Consumption (metric tons) 2 1062.4 1095.0 32.5 3.1% 3.3% 
  Ending stocks (metric tons) 3 154.1 150.9 -3.2 -2.1% 1.9% 
   stocks to use ratio 0.15 0.14    
Rice, milled      
  Area (hectares) 155.0 156.9 1.9 1.2%  
  Beginning stocks (metric tons) 3 75.4 78.4 3.0 4.0% 4.5% 
  Production (metric tons) 431.0 434.3 3.3 0.8% 2.4% 
   Supply (metric tons) 506.3 512.7 6.3 1.3% 2.8% 
  Exports (metric tons) 1 30.4 29.9 -0.5 -1.7% -1.6% 
  Consumption (metric tons) 2 427.9 432.1 4.1 1.0% 1.8% 
  Ending stocks (metric tons) 3 78.4 80.6 2.2 2.8% 5.6% 
   stocks to use ratio 0.18 0.19    
Total grains      
  Area (hectares) 689.4 693.4 4.0 0.6%  
  Beginning stocks (metric tons) 3 341.0 351.9 10.9 3.2% 1.6% 
  Production (metric tons) 2119.5 2208.4 88.9 4.2% 5.3% 
   Supply (metric tons) 2460.5 2560.3 99.8 4.1% 4.7% 
  Exports (metric tons) 1 269.4 264.3 -5.1 -1.9% -3.0% 
  Consumption (metric tons) 2 2108.6 2183.5 75.0 3.6% 3.3% 
  Ending stocks (metric tons) 3 351.9 376.8 24.9 7.1% 9.4% 
   stocks to use ratio 0.17 0.17    
Soybeans      
  Beginning stocks (metric tons) 3 62.7 53.0 -9.6 -15.4%  
  Production (metric tons) 220.9 235.7 14.9 6.7%  
   Supply (metric tons) 283.6 288.8 5.2 1.8%  
  Total Use (metric tons) 230.0 234.0 4.0 1.7%  
  Exports (metric tons) 79.4 77.9 -1.6 -2.0%  
  Ending stocks (metric tons) 53.0 54.1 1.0 1.9%  
   stocks to use ratio 0.23 0.23    
P = preliminary.  F = forecast.  1. Excludes intra-EU trade but includes intra-FSU trade.  2. If stocks not available, 
consumption includes stock change. 3. Stocks data represent different marketing years and not available in all countries 
                                                 
5  WASDE, USDA, November 10, 2008 and Food Outlook, FAO, November 2008. 
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behaviors which have non-linear responses (Westhoff, 2006). World prices are estimated from US farm 
price by taking into account historical relationships in the marketing chain and the increased transport 
costs associated with rising energy prices (figure 22). 
The stochastic analysis provides 500 solutions to the model based on random selections from the 
error distributions. We report results which are the average of those outcomes generated over the next 10 
years by the top 20 percent of petroleum prices, the middle 60 percent and the bottom 20 percent, which 
average $95, $67 and $48, respectively. Over the three years 2008 to 2010, the refiners acquisition price 
averages diverge from a low of $49 to a high of $91(figure 29), which are close to the 10-year averages 
for the whole projection period. Given recent developments in petroleum prices, this seems a reasonable 
range to use. The macroeconomic outlook assumed in the baseline that generated these price results are 
clearly optimistic now that the global economy has slowed and may slow further (figure 30). Given 
these assumptions, we can briefly review some key prices of grains and oilseeds. 
 
Figure 29. Refiners acquisition price of oil assumptions for alternative price projections 
 
Source: Derived from FAPRI 2008a. 
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Figure 30. Real GDP growth assumptions for the 2008 Baseline, selected countries 
 
 
Source: Global Insight, Inc. January 2008. 
 
The 2007/08 prices are the last USDA estimates, and the 2008/09 are the top, bottom and 
average of the range reported by USDA in the last estimate on November 10. All prices are in nominal 
terms. The remaining prices come from the model as generated by the stochastic simulations (figures 31-
36). Wheat and maize prices fall almost back to 06/07 levels in the low oil price scenario, which would 
be a decline of 37 and 28 percent, respectively, from 07/08 levels. In the high oil price scenario, the drop 
is 11 and 21 percent, respectively. Rice price projections fall at most 12 percent, and in the high oil price 
scenario hardly fall at all. Soybean price drops by 18 percent in the low oil price scenario to less than 
five percent in the high oil price scenario. Of course, soybean price is driven by oil and meal prices. As 
in the recent past, vegetable oil is the strong demand component and only declines slightly in the low oil 
price scenario. Since the stronger demand growth is on the oils side, meal declines in all scenarios and 
by 25 percent in the lowest oil price case.  
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Figure 31. Short term projection of US Export Prices of Wheat 
 
Source:  Derived from FAPRI 2008a. 
 
Figure 32. Short term projection of US Export Prices of Maize 
 
Source: Derived from FAPRI 2008a. 
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Figure 33. Short-term projection of US Export Prices of Rice 
 
Source:  Derived from FAPRI 2008a. 
 
Figure 34. Short-term projection of US Export Prices of Soybeans 
 
Source: Derived from FAPRI 2008a. 
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Figure 35. Short-term projection of US Export Prices of Soybean Oil 
 
Source: Derived from FAPRI 2008a. 
 
Figure 36. Short term projection of US Export Prices of Soybean Meal 
 
Source: Derived from FAPRI 2008a. 
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Given the way prices have already fallen recently, these all seem quite realistic and could even 
be lower than these results suggest. The reason is that the macroeconomic outlook is surely less 
optimistic in the near term than those shown in figure 30, where world GDP growth is more than 3.5 
percent in 2010. This implies that the lower end of the commodity price distributions may be more likely 
than the upper one, given the less favorable macroeconomic outlook. The caveat on the opposite side is 
that high input prices may discourage plantings in 2009 and thereby slow the production response that 
has been underway. In any case, the two most important drivers of this near-term outlook are the level of 
petroleum price and supply response that has been generated by high prices and favorable weather so far 
this year.   
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Annex Tables 
 
Table 1. Regional Grain Consumption and Production Changes, 2005/06 to 2007/08 
 05/06 07/08 Change %Change  05/06 07/08 Change %Change 
5 Grain Consumption (million metric tons) 5 Grain Production (million metric tons) 
  Australia 12.5 12.5 0.0 -0.4%   Australia 37.7 22.1 -15.6 -41.5% 
  Brazil 60.9 63.4 2.5 4.1%   Brazil 56.4 72.7 16.4 29.0% 
  Canada 29.0 27.9 -1.1 -3.9%   Canada 46.8 42.7 -4.1 -8.7% 
  China, Peoples Republic of 374.6 386.3 11.8 3.1%   China, Peoples Republic of 369.2 396.6 27.4 7.4% 
  EU-27 246.4 242.6 -3.8 -1.5%   EU-27 250.0 226.6 -23.4 -9.4% 
  India 178.0 192.4 14.4 8.1%   India 184.0 200.7 16.7 9.1% 
  Japan 34.0 33.4 -0.6 -1.9%   Japan 9.3 9.0 -0.3 -3.1% 
  Mexico 44.3 47.3 2.9 6.6%   Mexico 29.0 33.4 4.5 15.5% 
  Ukraine 22.6 24.0 1.4 6.2%   Ukraine 34.9 27.4 -7.5 -21.6% 
  United States 276.7 306.7 30.1 10.9%   United States 361.3 412.1 50.8 14.1% 
  Rest of World 653.6 676.7 23.1 3.5%   Rest of World 554.3 583.8 29.5 5.3% 
  World 1932.7 2013.3 80.7 4.2%   World 1932.8 2027.1 94.3 4.9% 
5 Grain Feed Use              
  China, Peoples Republic of 106.3 111.7 5.4 5.1%      
  ROW 615.4 625.2 9.7 1.6%      
  World (30%)* 721.7 736.9 15.1 2.1%      
5 Grain Food, Seed, & Industrial Use            
  United States 107.6 143.1 35.6 33.1%      
     US Maize Ethanol (70%)* 28.5 53.3 24.8 87.1%      
 
Source: PSD database for maize, wheat, sorghum, barley and rice, USDA. 
*30 percent of the maize for ethanol volume is the byproduct distiller’s dried grains (DDGs), which is used for feed. Thus in order to correctly reflect feed and other uses, 
we count 70 percent of the volume as used for ethanol (industrial use of maize) and 30 percent for feed.          
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Table 2. Regional Rice Consumption and Production Changes, 2005/06 to 2007/08 
  
 05/06 07/08 Change %Change  05/06 07/08 Change %Change 
Rice Consumption (million metric tons) Rice Production (million metric tons) 
  Australia 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -12.5%   Australia 0.7 0.0 -0.7 -97.3% 
  Brazil 8.5 8.4 0.0 -0.3%   Brazil 7.9 8.4 0.5 6.1% 
  China, Peoples Republic of 128.0 127.3 -0.7 -0.5%   China, Peoples Republic of 126.4 129.8 3.4 2.7% 
  EU-27 2.7 2.8 0.1 3.7%   EU-27 1.7 1.7 -0.1 -2.9% 
  India 85.1 90.8 5.7 6.7%   India 91.8 96.4 4.6 5.1% 
  Japan 8.3 8.2 -0.1 -1.2%   Japan 8.3 7.9 -0.3 -4.0% 
  Mexico 0.8 0.8 0.0 -2.1%   Mexico 0.2 0.2 0.0 7.7% 
  United States 3.8 3.9 0.1 2.8%   United States 7.1 6.3 -0.8 -11.2% 
  Rest of World 174.2 179.8 5.6 3.2%   Rest of World 174.2 178.7 4.5 2.6% 
  World 411.6 422.3 10.6 2.6%   World 418.3 429.5 11.2 2.7% 
 
Source: PSD database for rice, USDA. 
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Table 3. Regional Wheat Consumption and Production Changes, 2005/06 to 2007/08  
 
 05/06 07/08 Change %Change  05/06 07/08 Change %Change 
Wheat Consumption (million metric tons) Wheat Production (million metric tons) 
  Australia 6.4 6.2 -0.2 -3.1%   Australia 25.2 13.0 -12.1 -48.2% 
  Brazil 10.8 10.5 -0.3 -2.8%   Brazil 4.9 3.8 -1.0 -21.5% 
  China, Peoples Republic of 101.5 104.0 2.5 2.5%   China, Peoples Republic of 97.5 109.9 12.4 12.7% 
  EU-27 127.5 118.1 -9.4 -7.4%   EU-27 132.4 119.4 -13.0 -9.8% 
  India 70.0 75.9 5.9 8.4%   India 68.6 75.8 7.2 10.4% 
  Japan 6.0 6.0 0.0 -0.3%   Japan 0.9 0.9 0.0 4.0% 
  Mexico 6.1 6.4 0.3 4.1%   Mexico 3.0 3.6 0.6 19.2% 
  United States 31.4 29.0 -2.4 -7.5%   United States 57.3 56.2 -1.0 -1.8% 
  Rest of World 258.7 261.2 2.4 0.9%   Rest of World 231.2 228.2 -3.0 -1.3% 
  World 618.4 617.2 -1.2 -0.2%   World 620.9 610.9 -10.0 -1.6% 
 
Source: PSD database for wheat, USDA. 
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Table 4. Regional Maize Consumption and Production Changes, 2005/06 to 2007/08  
 
 05/06 07/08 Change %Change  05/06 07/08 Change %Change 
Maize Consumption (million metric tons) Maize Production (million metric tons) 
  Australia 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.4%   Australia 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.8% 
  Brazil 39.5 42.5 3.0 7.6%   Brazil 41.7 58.6 16.9 40.5% 
  China, Peoples Republic of 137.0 149.0 12.0 8.8%   China, Peoples Republic of 139.4 151.8 12.5 8.9% 
  EU-27 61.5 61.5 0.0 0.0%   EU-27 60.7 47.3 -13.4 -22.0% 
  India 14.2 16.9 2.7 19.0%   India 14.7 19.3 4.6 31.3% 
  Japan 16.7 16.5 -0.2 -1.2%   Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0% 
  Mexico 27.9 32.0 4.1 14.7%   Mexico 19.5 22.7 3.2 16.2% 
  United States 232.1 264.0 32.0 13.8%   United States 282.3 332.1 49.8 17.6% 
  Rest of World 175.2 191.3 16.1 9.2%   Rest of World 139.9 158.1 18.2 13.0% 
  World 704.4 774.1 69.6 9.9%   World 698.5 790.2 91.7 13.1% 
 
Source: PSD database for maize, USDA. 
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Table 5. Regional Barley Consumption and Production Changes, 2005/06 to 2007/08  
 
 05/06 07/08 Change %Change  05/06 07/08 Change %Change 
Barley Consumption (million metric tons) Barley Production (million metric tons) 
  Australia 3.5 3.2 -0.3 -8.7%   Australia 9.5 5.9 -3.6 -0.4 
  Brazil 0.6 0.5 -0.1 -11.1%   Brazil 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 
  China, Peoples Republic of 5.6 4.3 -1.3 -22.8%   China, Peoples Republic of 3.4 3.2 -0.2 -0.1 
  EU-27 54.1 54.4 0.3 0.6%   EU-27 54.8 57.7 3.0 0.1 
  India 1.2 1.1 -0.1 -5.8%   India 1.2 1.3 0.1 0.1 
  Japan 1.7 1.6 -0.1 -4.2%   Japan 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
  Mexico 1.0 1.1 0.1 10.5%   Mexico 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 
  United States 4.6 4.4 -0.2 -3.4%   United States 4.6 4.6 0.0 0.0 
  Rest of World 68.2 66.1 -2.1 -3.0%   Rest of World 62.0 59.0 -2.9 0.0 
  World 140.2 136.6 -3.6 -2.5%   World 136.8 133.2 -3.6 0.0 
 
Source: PSD database for barley, USDA. 
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Table 6. Regional Vegetable oil Consumption and Production Changes, 2005/06 to 2007/08   
 
 05/06 07/08 Change %Change  05/06 07/08 Change %Change 
 4 Vegetable Oils 
Consumption (million metric tons) Production of 4 Oils (million metric tons) 
  Argentina 0.8 1.3 0.6 72.0%   Argentina 7.5 8.6 1.1 14.3% 
  Brazil 3.4 4.1 0.7 22.0%   Brazil 5.6 6.3 0.8 13.5% 
  China, Peoples Republic of 17.5 19.2 1.7 9.9%   China, Peoples Republic of 11.2 10.9 -0.3 -2.6% 
  EU-27 16.6 17.5 0.9 5.3%   EU-27 10.7 12.0 1.3 12.4% 
  India 9.0 9.0 0.1 0.7%   India 3.9 3.8 -0.1 -1.9% 
  Indonesia 4.4 4.8 0.4 10.1%   Indonesia 15.6 18.3 2.7 17.6% 
  Malaysia 3.0 3.4 0.5 15.1%   Malaysia 15.6 17.8 2.2 14.1% 
  United States 9.7 10.7 1.0 10.7%   United States 9.9 10.2 0.3 3.0% 
  Rest of World 31.4 34.6 3.3 10.4%   Rest of World 18.5 19.5 1.0 5.5% 
  World 95.6 104.8 9.2 9.6%   World 98.4 107.4 9.0 9.2% 
Industrial Use of 4 Oils              
  United States 0.7 1.4 0.7 93.1%      
  EU-27 6.3 7.3 1.0 15.4%      
  World 14.8 18.2 3.4 23.2%      
Food and Other Use of 4 
Oils              
  World 80.8 86.6 5.7 7.1%      
 
Source: PSD database for soybean oil, sunflower oil, rapeseed oil and palm oil, USDA. 
  
 51 
Annex Figure 
   Wheat annual and monthly prices, July 1991 to August 2008. 
 
 
Source:  IMF commodity price database (monthly) and USDA (annual). 
